Political Incarceration in Turkey: Human Rights Abuses Against Prisoners and Detainees Among the COVID-19 Pandemic

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I. INTRODUCTION

II. TURKEY’S HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
   A. The Justice and Development Party (AKP)
      1. AKP’s Struggle to Remain in Power
      2. AKP’s Influence on Turkey’s Courts
   B. Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism Laws
   C. European Court of Human Rights Decisions

III. TURKISH PENAL REFORM LAW NO. 7242
   A. How Law No. 7242 Interacts with Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism Laws
   B. Method of Reform and Effects

IV. COVID-19 PANDEMIC
   C. Transmissibility
   D. Mortality Rates and Risk Factors
   E. COVID-19 in Overcrowded Turkish Prisons

V. DOMESTIC PROSECUTION

VI. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTION
   A. The European Convention on Human Rights
      1. Right to Life
      2. Prohibition of Torture
      3. Right to Liberty and Security
      4. Prohibition Against Discrimination
   B. Likely Result

VII. POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION
   A. Domestic
   B. International

VIII. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION

As the notorious Turkish mob leader, Alaattin Cakıcı, exercised his newfound freedom, political opponents to Turkey’s ruling party were and are left behind in Turkish prisons during the SARS-CoV-2 (“COVID-19”) pandemic.¹ These political prisoners are lawyers, politicians, activists, and journalists who have been charged and convicted under Turkey’s so-called “anti-terrorism” laws.² One notable figure stuck in prison during the pandemic was Ahmet Altan, a 71-year-old award-winning author, who was imprisoned for more than four and a half years—due to charges that have since been dropped—and who has been looked to as an example of Turkey’s continuing human rights abuses through its anti-terrorism laws.³

Close to half a century before Altan’s own arrest, his father, Çetin Altan, served police officers coffee when they came to arrest him after the 1971 coup.⁴ Altan followed in his father’s footsteps by doing the same when police came to arrest him after the attempted coup in 2016.⁵ Altan also followed in his father’s footsteps by publishing from inside prison, writing “I will never see the world again. I will never see a sky unframed by the walls of a courtyard” in his latest book.⁶ Thankfully, he was wrong.⁷

Altan was initially convicted for “attempting to overthrow the Turkish constitutional order” in 2018, but he was released a year after being sentenced to life in prison without the opportunity for parole.⁸ Altan was then re-arrested and convicted for “aiding a terrorist group without being a member of it,” resulting in a ten-and-a-half-year sentence that he served until mid-April 2021.⁹ Turkey’s 2020 parole reform response to the pandemic excluded Altan based on the nature of his crime. Turkey’s government classified Altan as a terrorist, hinging this classification on supposed subliminal messages Altan sent during a television interview the day before the failed coup in 2016.¹⁰

² Id.
⁵ Id.
⁶ Id.
⁷ Id.; Agence France-Presse, supra note 3.
⁸ Id.; Agence France-Presse, supra note 3.
⁹ Id.; Lynk & Weikle, supra note 3.
Altan’s lawyer, international human rights attorney Philippe Sands, characterizes his charges as “trumped up” and utterly lacking in any factual basis, backed up by the Turkish government recently dropping all charges against the journalist.12

Meanwhile, Altan was forced to write on scraps of paper that his lawyers smuggled out so that he may continue to have a voice even when he was unjustly stripped of his freedom.13 Yet, Altan’s voice was further limited by his unwillingness to publish in Turkish for fear of his publisher’s safety.14 Altan’s prison memoir has been published in several languages, but many of his own people are unable to read his words. Altan was only eventually released and his charges dropped because his lawyer pursued his case beyond Turkey’s domestic courts and up to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which concluded that Turkey had violated Altan’s civil rights and demanded his freedom from the Turkish government.15 Turkey’s Court of Cassation, its appeals court, ordered Altan’s release a day later,16 likely due to Altan’s high public profile. However, Altan’s lawyer acknowledged that the ECtHR is “deluged with cases from Turkey,” numbering in the tens of thousands.17 Altan’s own ECtHR application was pending for over five years, since January 2017.18 While Altan won his freedom, his words may be right for his fellow journalists and activists; many of them are unlikely to ever see the world again.

This note will discuss Turkey’s recent history of human rights abuses against political prisoners like Altan who have been charged under the state’s anti-terrorism laws. International court decisions have found that these laws violate multiple human rights treaties and conventions that Turkey has ratified, but Turkey continues to perform these abuses.19 The situation has only become more dire for political prisoners during the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to the pandemic, the Turkish government has pushed forward Law No. 7242 (“Law”) to reform the state’s parole system.20 However, Turkey’s ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), has explicitly excluded political prisoners from the opportunity for early parole.21 Because of the nature of the reform, pretrial detainees—many of whom were arrested under

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11 Id.
12 Agence France-Presse, supra note 3.
13 Lynk & Weikle, supra note 3.
14 Id.
15 Id.; Agence France-Presse, supra note 3.
16 Agence France-Presse, supra note 3.
17 Lynk & Weikle, supra note 3.
18 Id.
19 See infra Section II.C.
20 See infra Part III.
21 Id.
Turkey’s anti-terrorism laws\textsuperscript{22}—have also been left to face the pandemic in prison.

This note’s primary purpose is to consider possible domestic and international solutions to the human rights abuses Turkey is committing against its pretrial detainees. Parts II, III, and IV will give background on Turkey’s human rights abuses, the parole reform law, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Parts V and VI will analyze the possibilities of both domestic and international cases against Turkey. Finally, Part VII will propose domestic and international solutions and analyze the likelihood that those solutions might be effective.

II. TURKEY’S HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

Human rights abuses from the Turkish government are not a new phenomenon. However, these abuses have been particularly targeted against the ruling party’s political opponents during the AKP’s tenure. The following sections will outline the AKP’s rise to power, how it has maintained said power, and how the party targets its political prisoners and detainees.

A. The Justice and Development Party (AKP)

The AKP rose to power through elections in 2002 after running on a platform prioritizing economic security and EU membership.\textsuperscript{23} However, while the party claims a secularist agenda, many observers suspect it has not truly departed from its Islamist roots due to its continued, conservative stance on social issues.\textsuperscript{24} Two major examples of the AKP’s advancement of conservative issues are its efforts to Islamize both the state’s educational systems and its judiciary.\textsuperscript{25} These efforts are not only problematic in that they call the AKP’s actual agenda and its transparency into question, but also because the efforts violate the principles of secularism written into the Turkish Constitution.\textsuperscript{26}

1. AKP’s Struggle to Remain in Power

The AKP has faced major periods of turbulence during its tenure, most notably in 2008 and 2016. In 2008, the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) found the AKP guilty of advancing anti-secular policies unconstitutionally, and the party was in danger of being shut down.\textsuperscript{27} However, by a narrow one-vote margin, the party escaped being banned from Turkish politics.\textsuperscript{28} In 2016,

\textsuperscript{22} See infra Part III.A.


\textsuperscript{24} Id.

\textsuperscript{25} Id. at 55.

\textsuperscript{26} Id. at 73.

\textsuperscript{27} Id.; Vincent Boland, Turkey’s AKP Survives Court Fight, FIN. TIMES (July 30, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/24fffa90-5e41-11dd-b354-000077b07858.

\textsuperscript{28} Boland, supra note 27.
the AKP government survived a bloody military coup attempt—an event that played a crucial part in AKP’s human rights abuses that followed. The AKP government arrested tens of thousands of Turkish citizens for terrorist associations in the ensuing weeks, and thousands of civil servants, academics, and journalists lost their jobs due to alleged links to the coup.

The European Union (EU) accused Turkey’s leadership “of using the coup attempt as an excuse to eliminate the [political] opposition,” which is consistent with questions on how Turkey was able to determine the arrestees’ alleged links to the coup so quickly. According to the Council of Europe in 2019, the Turkish government’s crackdown following the attempted coup has resulted in the second-largest prison population in Europe—approximately 300,000—and Europe’s most overcrowded prison system. Certain reports have found that occupancy levels in Turkish prisons can reach as high as 153 percent.

2. AKP’s Influence on Turkey’s Courts

The TCC is the state’s highest legal authority, and the President of Turkey, currently Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, appoints twelve out of its fifteen members. Following the AKP’s close call in 2008, the party was eager to increase its influence on the TCC, which had been described as “a bastion of secularism,” as well as the state’s wider judiciary. The AKP has primarily accomplished this by purging approximately 4,000 judges in the wake of the 2016 coup attempt and replacing them with young loyalists, who are being appointed and “promoted because of their political connections,” despite having little to no professional experience.

30 Id.
31 Id.
33 Let’s Not Forget, supra note 1.
The thousands of purges and replacements have contributed to a “brain drain” in Turkey’s judiciary since many of the newly-appointed judges are barely out of college. The head of the Turkish Bar Association estimates the average level of experience of Turkey’s 14,000 judges is only two-and-a-half years of practicing law. Even Turkey’s highest courts have been filled with inexperienced appointees, with judges who have less than five years of experience being appointed to the Supreme Court of Appeals—Turkey’s highest appeals court. In fact, a lawmaker for the AKP and chairman of the Justice Commission in Turkey’s parliament, Hakki Kolyu, acknowledged that some judges “have been appointed without adequate training.” One lawyer, who understandably wished to remain anonymous, had one of these young judges presiding over her case ask her to help write the court’s verdict, despite the case being “very simple.”

In addition to these new judges’ youth and inexperience, an influx of cases followed the failed 2016 coup that has overburdened the judiciary. To give an idea of the scale of the judiciary’s workload, over 500,000 people have been investigated since the coup attempt. This overburdening has increased the use of copy-paste indictments and rulings. Yonca Demir, an academic prosecuted under Turkey’s anti-terrorism laws, called her trial a sham and said, “Whatever you say in court has no impact whatsoever on the judges. From the indictment to the rulings, everything was a copy-paste.” Combine inexperience, a massive workload, and the fact that Turkey has not reformed the dismissal laws that allowed 4,000 judges to be removed, and Turkey is left with a judiciary too timid to confront the Turkish AKP government and enforce laws against it.

While Turkish officials claim the process is merely routine and due to health and administrative reasons, the Turkish government also exerts control over the judiciary by constantly reshuffling its judges. These switches often occur in the middle of proceedings, such as during Gultan Kisanak and

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38 Gall, supra note 36.
39 Id.
40 Special Report, supra note 37.
41 Id.; see also INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, TURKEY’S JUDICIAL REFORM STRATEGY AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 8 (2019) [hereinafter INT’L COMM’N (2019)].
42 Special Report, supra note 37.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
47 See infra Section VII.A (discussing the laws regulating judicial dismissal).
48 Special Report, supra note 37.
Sebahat Tuncel’s trial in 2019. The women’s trial occurred before a three-judge panel, but, by the time Kisanak and Tuncel were convicted, sixteen judges had passed through those three seats. The women’s lawyer, Cihan Aydin—a human rights lawyer and chairman of the Diyarbakir bar association—said, “At every hearing there was a new group of judges, and every time we had to start the defence from the beginning.” Such judicial switching prevents defendants from mounting effective defenses and decreases the likelihood that AKP’s political opponents will be released.

Despite President Erdoğan’s assertions to the contrary, Turkey does not have an independent judiciary. Former judge and appeals court prosecutor Omer Faruk describes Turkey’s current judiciary as a “weapon of the political government,” and adds, “This is not a problem in Turkey that just erupted in one day, but it is a problem that reached its peak under this government.”

B. Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism Laws

The state’s anti-terrorism laws can minimally be described as “broad,” and their primary function seems to be enabling the Turkish government to detain and punish its political opponents. Major targets of these laws have been activists, journalists, and lawyers. Those advocating against Turkey’s anti-terrorism laws argue that they employ vague language to allow Turkey’s government to repeatedly “prosecute the expression of non-violent opinions” and place an undue burden on free expression in the state.

In 2019, for example, Professor Fünsun Üstel became the first academic to go to prison merely for having signed a peace petition that the Turkish government viewed as “denigrating the Turkish nation.” The peace petition at issue advocated that the Turkish government restart peace negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), at one point totaling 2,212 signatures. Many of the signatories, including Üstel, have been subject to criminal investigations and copy-paste indictments. Üstel joins the ranks of

49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See id.
53 Gall, supra note 36.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 46.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.; see also supra Section II.A.2 (discussing copy-paste indictments and rulings).
691 academics who have gone to trial on charges of “making propaganda for a terrorist organization” as of April 24, 2019.61

C. European Court of Human Rights Decisions

The Turkish government’s exclusion of prisoners convicted under its anti-terrorism laws caught the international human rights community’s attention due to Turkey’s repeated human rights abuses through the implementation of such laws.62 In thirteen separate decisions from 2015 to 2020, the ECtHR, the United Nations Human Rights Council, and the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention have held that Turkey’s anti-terrorism laws violate international human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).63

III. TURKISH PENAL REFORM LAW NO. 7242

The Turkish government passed Law No. 7242 (“Law”) on April 13, 2020 to address hazardous prison overcrowding and prevent the spread of COVID-19 in its prisons.64 The result of the Law was to release approximately 100,000 convicted prisoners65—approximately a third of Turkey’s prison population66—either by cutting their sentences short or releasing them on parole.67 The Law included prisoners convicted of corruption, violent crimes, and drug offenses, but excluded prisoners convicted under the country’s anti-terrorism laws; and, despite their equal risk of contracting COVID-19, the Law did not even attempt to address prisoners in pretrial detention.68 As of April 2020, there were approximately 43,000 pretrial detainees in Turkey’s prison system.69

Overcrowding in Turkish prisons has worsened as the Turkish government

61 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 46.


63 Id.

64 Let’s Not Forget, supra note 1.


arrests more and more of its political opponents, many of whom wait years in pretrial detention before having their days in court.

A. How Law No. 7242 Interacts with Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism Laws

In addition to the Turkish Law’s exclusion of prisoners convicted under the country’s anti-terrorism laws, its exclusion of pretrial detainees also functions to target the government’s political opponents. The Bar Human Rights Committee of England & Wales (BHRC) notes that,

[I]n conducting observations of the trials of a number of these political prisoners, . . . many have been subjected to excessive and unlawful pre-trial detention . . . and . . . the detention of many of these individuals appears to have been pursued for an improper motive — namely to stifle dissent and limit the freedom of political debate . . .

The BHRC has also observed a pattern in which the Turkish authorities pursue and arrest individuals who have already been released or acquitted. The stark mistreatment of those Turkey classes as terrorists is made clear by looking at the Law’s method of reform.

B. Method of Reform and Effects

The Law shortens the minimum amount of time after which most prisoners may be released on parole depending on their sentence. Before the bill, the general rule was that prisoners had to complete two-thirds of their prison sentences before they could be freed on supervised release. Now, most prisoners only have to serve one-sixth of their sentence before being released under the early parole reform.

Prisoners convicted under anti-terrorism laws were already worse off since they had to complete three-quarters of their prison sentences before becoming eligible for supervised release. The minimum sentence completion before supervised release for prisoners convicted under anti-terrorism laws is unchanged under the reform. For example, an ordinary prisoner with a nine-year sentence is now eligible for supervised release after only 18 months of parole.

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70 Let’s Not Forget, supra note 1.
71 Maximum Pretrial Detention in Turkey Increased from 5 to 7 Years, STOCKHOLM CTR. FOR FREEDOM (Aug. 27, 2017), https://stockholmcf.org/maximum-pretrial-detention-in-turkey-increased-from-5-to-7-years/.
72 BHRC, supra note 62.
73 Id.
74 Yildiz, supra note 68.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
prison time served.  

80 Prisoners convicted under anti-terrorism laws and sentenced to nine years are only eligible for supervised release after serving 69 months of their sentence.

IV. COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Despite its name, COVID-19 came into play on the global stage at the beginning of 2020, and the pandemic has had a broad impact on every aspect of both life and law. Around the world, one of the critical legal questions resulting from the pandemic was what to do with prisoners during such a health crisis. Due to limited space, limited resources, and high traffic levels going in and out of prisons, incarcerated individuals are particularly at-risk during health crises.

While there are good reasons for imprisoning individuals who have been convicted of or charged with crimes—i.e., incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution—prisoners still have human rights and society still has a duty to protect them. Society must balance the four justifications for punishment against prisoners’ human right to life in times such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Determining this balance is especially important in states whose prisons are chronically overcrowded, like Turkey.

C. Transmissibility

Due to the novelty of the COVID-19 virus, scientists are still learning about its transmissibility and mortality rates. Essentially, COVID-19 is a virus spread through a respiratory pathogen—meaning it is primarily an airborne disease. The virus may spread from one person to another through respiratory droplets released when an infected person “coughs, sneezes, sings, talks, or breathes.” The primary infection method occurs when another person inhales those respiratory droplets released by the infected person. However, the virus can also spread when people touch surfaces where respiratory droplets have landed and then touch their mouths, noses, or eyes.

Evidence suggests that droplets and airborne particles released by infected individuals can remain suspended in the air. Best practices are to keep at

79 Id.
80 Yildiz, supra note 68.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
least six feet away from others and wear face coverings whenever in public.\footnote{Coronavirus Disease FAQs, supra note 82.} Face coverings—specifically those that cover both the nose and mouth—prevent infected individuals from spreading respiratory droplets and spreading the virus to uninfected individuals.\footnote{Id.} Along with social distancing and hygiene precautions—i.e., washing hands and disinfecting surfaces—face coverings are among the most important factors in preventing the spread of COVID-19.

\textbf{D. Mortality Rates and Risk Factors}

The mortality rate of COVID-19 is not stable across continents, states, or even time. For example, the mortality rate in the U.S. decreased from 6.7 percent in April 2020 to 1.9 percent in September 2020.\footnote{Ivana Kottasová, \textit{COVID-19 Deaths Aren’t Rising as Fast in Europe and US, Despite Soaring New Infections. That Doesn’t Mean the Virus is Less Deadly}, CNN (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/28/europe/coronavirus-death-rate-second-wave-lower-intl/index.html.} In the United Kingdom, the mortality rate dropped from nearly 3 percent in June 2020 to approximately 0.5 percent in August 2020 and then rose back up to 0.75 percent in October 2020.\footnote{Id.} Several population factors and characteristics may drive mortality rate shifts, such as age distribution.\footnote{Id.} Mortality rates are also likely to fall as time passes—even if infection rates spike again—as scientists and doctors learn more about the virus and become more adept at treating it.\footnote{Id.}

Age is a critical factor to COVID-19 mortality rates because older individuals face higher risks of complications and serious effects once infected with the virus; therefore, the risk of death from the virus increases with age.\footnote{Id.} Beyond age, many other characteristics can increase an individual’s likelihood of death or serious complications once infected with the virus. These characteristics primarily include pre-existing conditions such as heart conditions, obesity, smoking, asthma, and high blood pressure.\footnote{Id.} Individuals who are immunocompromised have both higher risks of simply contracting COVID-19 as well as of experiencing serious complications once infected.\footnote{Id.}

\textbf{E. COVID-19 in Overcrowded Turkish Prisons}
Turkey is home to Europe’s most overcrowded prison system, with certain facilities reaching occupancy levels of 153 percent. While overcrowding is not a new problem in Turkish prisons and a reform has been in the works for years, the COVID-19 pandemic pushed the AKP administration into immediate action out of necessity. Limited space is already one reason prisons often function as infection amplifiers, and overcrowding amplifies the risks even further. Social distancing—a major way of reducing transmission—is already difficult in prison environments, and overcrowding makes it practically impossible. Overcrowding also drains resources more quickly, such as soap being used up faster and not having enough face coverings for everyone. In short, overcrowding makes an already dire situation even worse.

V. DOMESTIC PROSECUTION

An action for annulment of the Law has already been filed with the TCC; nonetheless, since the AKP holds considerable sway over the TCC, the action is unlikely to succeed. Turkish Law No. 5271 (Section 1(d) of Article 141 of Turkey’s Code of Criminal Procedure) provides that “Persons who . . . have been lawfully detained but not brought before a legal authority within a reasonable time and who have not been tried within such time . . . during criminal investigation or prosecution may demand all pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages they sustained from the State.” However, a “reasonable” standard is subjective and unlikely to hold up against the AKP’s sway over the judiciary.

As opposed to how Turkey’s TCC might interpret reasonable pretrial detention, the ECtHR interprets a similar provision in the ECHR more narrowly. Therefore, instead of looking to domestic law, activists seeking justice for pretrial detainees and those convicted of anti-terrorism laws must look to international law.

VI. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTION

96 Turkey To Free Thousands, supra note 32.
97 Let’s Not Forget, supra note 1.
98 Id.
99 Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, supra note 81.
100 Yildiz, supra note 68.
102 See supra Section II.A.2.
103 See infra Section VI.A.3.
The ECtHR, formed in 1959 and based in Strasbourg, France, serves to safeguard the ECHR.104 ECtHR judgments are binding on states that have signed and ratified the ECHR, allowing the court to enforce the convention.105

A. The European Convention on Human Rights

The ECHR is an international human rights treaty between the members of the Council of Europe.106 The Council of Europe formed and proposed the ECHR primarily in response to the Second World War, drafting the convention in 1949.107 Turkey ratified the ECHR on May 18, 1954, and is therefore subject to its provisions and ECtHR decisions.108 The ECHR guarantees prisoners a right to life, a prohibition of torture, a right to liberty and security, and a prohibition against discrimination.109

1. Right to Life

Article 2 of the ECHR provides a right to life for prisoners, ensuring that “No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”110 Turkey’s exclusion of pretrial detainees from the recent Law puts these detainees’ lives at risk due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Logically, we know these detainees’ lives are at risk. However, it is difficult to put together an accurate picture of coronavirus spread in Turkey’s prisons since there is little reliable data; therefore, it may be useful to look at COVID-19 spread in the country generally. As of September 6, 2021, there have been 6,435,773 confirmed cases and 57,283 deaths, with the first spike in cases and deaths occurring in April 2020111—when Law No. 7242 was passed. This calculates to an approximate 0.89 percent mortality rate in Turkey’s general population.

As for Turkish prisons, like in many places around the world, reports have indicated a lack of available tests, meaning there will be unreported confirmed

105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
110 Id. art. 2.
cases.\textsuperscript{112} Going beyond lacking tests, Turkey’s Ministry of Health instructed certain prisons to stop testing altogether.\textsuperscript{113} As of September 2021, information collected by Prison Insider showed at least 446 confirmed positive cases of coronavirus amongst prisoners and six confirmed prisoner deaths, though those numbers had not changed in over a year\textsuperscript{114} despite a major spike in Turkey’s COVID-19 cases and deaths in December 2020, April 2021, and August 2021.\textsuperscript{115} Using Prison Insider’s numbers to calculate the mortality rate in Turkish prisons, Turkish prisoners face a 1.35 percent mortality rate once infected. While the prison system’s mortality rate is higher than in the general public, it is important to remember that the chronic lack of testing and likely underreporting by the administration decrease the significance of the difference to essentially nothing.

Even with the comparatively low number of reported deaths (notably lacking any reports from the latter third of 2020 or any reports from 2021 at all), Turkish prisons’ mortality rate is not insignificant, and COVID-19 is a serious illness.\textsuperscript{116} Many common preexisting conditions put prisoners at risk of both contracting COVID-19 and experiencing severe side effects once infected.\textsuperscript{117} Disregarding Turkey’s unequal treatment of pretrial detainees versus other prisoners, Turkey is not sufficiently protecting any of its prisoners’ right to life. A report from the Civil Society in the Penal System Association prepared in September 2020 found disregard of social distancing protocols, poor disinfection of common spaces, lack of hygiene products,\textsuperscript{118} and lack of masks\textsuperscript{119} in Turkish prisons. Prison institutions are already considered infection amplifiers,\textsuperscript{120} and lack of protection equipment and hygiene products adds additional risk.


\textsuperscript{113} One such prison is the Silivri Prison, notably where Ahmet Altan was being held. Turkey Stops Testing Prisoners for COVID-19 in Notorious Silivri Prison, STOCKHOLM CTR. FOR FREEDOM (May 20, 2020), https://stockholmcfr.org/turkey-stops-testing-prisoners-for-covid-19-in-notorious-silivri-prison/ [hereinafter Turkey Stops Testing]. Altan had managed not to contract COVID-19 as of February 2021, despite the virus’ presence in the prison. Lynk & Weikle, supra note 3.

\textsuperscript{114} Middle East, supra note 112.

\textsuperscript{115} Turkey Situation, supra note 111.

\textsuperscript{116} See Turkey: COVID-19, supra note 69.

\textsuperscript{117} Id.; see supra Part III.


\textsuperscript{119} Middle East, supra note 112.

\textsuperscript{120} See Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, supra note 81.
2. Prohibition of Torture

Article 3 of the ECHR simply provides that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” On its face, Article 3 may not seem particularly relevant to a discussion on pretrial detention; however, considering the poor conditions in Turkish prisons, the lack of proper personal protective equipment, and the threat of COVID-19, Turkey’s blanket exclusion of pretrial detainees from its incarceration reform may qualify as inhuman or degrading treatment.

Though the ECHR provides no general obligation for prisons to release detainees due to health concerns, Article 2 and Article 3 work in combination to place states under a duty to provide prisoners with adequate medical assistance. The ECtHR has specifically interpreted Article 3 to require: the transfer of prisoners to civilian hospitals when prisons lack the necessary equipment and specialists; the conversion of a prisoner’s sentence to house arrest when their age or health status is incompatible with remaining in prison; and the protection of prisoners with pre-existing conditions from factors that may exacerbate their condition. The last interpretation comes from the case Elefteriadis v. Romania, in which the ECtHR found that the Romanian government violated Article 3 by keeping a prisoner with chronic pulmonary disease in a cell with smokers, exposing him to harmful passive smoke.

The situation in Elefteriadis is comparable to a pandemic scenario where a prisoner has certain pre-existing conditions that predispose them to catching, dying from, or suffering complications from the circulating virus. Pre-existing conditions are common among prisoners. Lacking information from within Turkey itself and using the U.S. as a sample, U.S. state prisons saw rates of chronic medical conditions reaching 42.8 percent in 2009. The risk of severe illness from COVID-19 also increases with age, putting older pretrial detainees and political prisoners like Ahmet Altan at even higher risk from remaining in prison during the pandemic.

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121 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 109, art. 3.
122 See BHRC, supra note 62.
124 Id. at 7.
125 Id.; Elefteriadis v. Romania, Case No. 38427/05 (Jan. 25, 2011), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:%222002-634%22}.
126 Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, supra note 81.
3. Right to Liberty and Security

Article 5 of the ECHR provides a right to liberty and security, ensuring that “[e]veryone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.”\(^{129}\) Domestic policy in Turkey requires much the same as the ECHR, simply mandating that detainees be “brought before the trial court within a reasonable time” and “receive a judgment within a reasonable time.”\(^{130}\) The ECHR standard is stricter than Turkey’s domestic policy because it requires “prompt” appearance rather than just appearance within a “reasonable” time.

The United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture has issued detailed advice to governments on COVID-19 protocols, specifically advising that countries review all cases of pretrial detention.\(^{131}\) Additionally, numerous cases before the ECtHR from before the COVID-19 pandemic have already found Turkey to have violated Article 5 §3 of the ECHR.\(^{132}\) In one case, *Fetullah Akpolat v. Turkey*, the ECtHR was considering a pretrial detention period of approximately ten years and six months, which the court indicated was comparable to detention periods in other cases such as *Tutar v. Turkey* and *Cahit Demirel v. Turkey*.\(^{133}\) While the extended lengths of these pretrial detention periods are probably not typical, that they occurred at all is indicative of a wider problem in Turkey’s pretrial detention system, and the ECtHR’s analysis will only get more strict under COVID-19 conditions.

4. Prohibition Against Discrimination

Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR provides a prohibition against discrimination,\(^{134}\) and discrimination is the essence of the complaint against Turkey’s Law No. 7242. In other words, the Law discriminates against people with political views contrary to the AKP. While the ECtHR does not have the authority to annul national laws, states that have ratified the ECHR are bound by the court’s decisions and bound to amending legislation that violates the ECHR.\(^{135}\) The ECtHR would almost certainly hold that Turkey violated the ECHR when considering the case of an *individual* pretrial detainee arrested

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\(^{129}\) *European Convention on Human Rights*, supra note 109, art. 5 § 3.

\(^{130}\) Act No. 5271 of 4 Dec. 2004, art. 141 § 1(d); *see also supra* Part V.


\(^{133}\) *Id.* ¶¶24-25.

\(^{134}\) *European Convention on Human Rights*, supra note 109, Protocol 12.

following the 2016 attempted coup, who is still waiting for their trial, and who has not had access to adequate hygiene products or personal protective equipment. However, in order to force Turkey to amend its Law, there needs to be discrimination in how the law is written or applied—hence, why the prohibition against discrimination is crucial to this analysis. Concerning Law No. 7242, there is discrimination in excluding political prisoners and detainees who have not yet been convicted.

The issue with enforcing this protocol against Turkey is that, while the state signed the protocol on April 18, 2001, Turkey has yet to ratify it. Protocol No. 12 is therefore not binding on Turkey as a matter of law, and challenging the Law itself before the ECtHR would probably be unsuccessful.

B. Likely Result

To hold Turkey accountable for its human rights abuses during the COVID-19 pandemic on a broad rather than individual scale, activists in the country need to push to get Protocol No. 12 of the ECHR ratified. Individual pretrial detainees or political prisoners bringing claims under the ECHR would probably succeed, but, while these cases may set precedents, they only enforce relief for the individuals in question. Lacking ratification of Protocol No. 12, the ECtHR might also consider customary international law—defined as norms that emerge “when a preponderance of states (and other actors with international legal personality) from different regions of the world converge on a common understanding of the norm’s content and expect future behavior to conform to the norm.”

While the ECtHR’s jurisdiction is limited to the ECHR and its protocols, the ECHR is a living document, and the court’s interpretation is often guided by customary international law. Additionally, language from ECtHR decisions suggests that international law may provide a relevant obligation even if the state that is a party to the litigation has not ratified a particular treaty or protocol. This runs contrary to the basic international law principle that states cannot be bound without their consent; though, absent persistent objection, “silence in the face of a developing customary norm is presumed to evidence consent.”

Nevertheless, Turkey’s continued persecution of AKP’s political opponents through both anti-terrorism laws and, now, Law No. 7242

136 Treaty List, supra note 108.
137 Considering also the amount of time it takes to appear before the ECtHR and get a decision, an individualistic approach for the tens of thousands of pretrial detainees is unhelpful and unrealistic. See, e.g., Lynk & Weikle, supra note 3.
140 Id. at 246.
141 Hannum et al., supra note 138, at 143.
could amount to persistent objection to a customary norm for freedom to engage in political processes without discrimination for political views.\textsuperscript{142}

Regional customary law from the EU could be even more persuasive than international custom, but the distinction between a legally binding norm and simply likeminded practices can be nebulous.\textsuperscript{143} Either way, it would be challenging to enforce customary law against Turkey without a clear protocol outlining such a tool’s uses and limitations that EU member states could ratify.\textsuperscript{144}

Finally, even if a binding challenge against Law No. 7242 could succeed before the ECtHR, Turkey would be unlikely to heed the decision. For example, despite the numerous cases decided against Turkey’s anti-terrorism laws on the international stage, the AKP has failed to change its stance on taking political prisoners and punishing them unduly—as evidenced by their explicit exclusion under Law No. 7242. Simply releasing one high-profile prisoner on the ECtHR’s demand\textsuperscript{145} does not signify a departure from Turkey’s long-standing policy of ignoring international court decisions.

VII. POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION

A. Domestic

Domestic goals primarily include methods for reforming Turkey’s judiciary to operate outside of the political influence of the AKP so that justice may be served from within the country’s own court system without having to seek international intervention and remedies. The easiest way to remove influence is for the ruling party and executive branch to agree to an independent judiciary. However, relying on people in power to give up that power is both dangerous and unrealistic. The AKP and President Erdoğan have “publicly guaranteed” an independent judiciary even as they work to increase their influence on it.\textsuperscript{146} Perhaps Turkish citizens rising up and electing a different party to power, other than the AKP, would stop the trend away from an independent judiciary; however, there is no way to know how smoothly an actual transfer of power would occur or whether a different party in the executive branch would act any differently.

In an ideal world, Turkey’s executive branch and its officials would publicly and privately endorse the separation of powers, enforce court decisions—even those contrary to itself—and would actively refrain from impeding the freedom

\textsuperscript{142} See G.A. Res. 217(III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 2, 7, 19–21 (Dec. 10, 1948) for establishment of this customary norm in international law.

\textsuperscript{143} See Ziemele, supra note 139, at 250–51.

\textsuperscript{144} See id.

\textsuperscript{145} Agence France-Presse, supra note 3.

\textsuperscript{146} Gall, supra note 36.

The legislature is further unlikely to help enforce the separation of powers because the AKP successfully decreased its power through the 2017 constitutional referendum.\footnote{Ekim & Kirişci, supra note 34.} The referendum’s result was to elevate the president above legislative scrutiny\footnote{Id.} and reduce legislative decision-making power by requiring an absolute majority—above 50 percent—in order for the legislature to re-pass bills the president sends back for reconsideration.\footnote{Id.} The previous requirement to bypass the president’s objections was a simple majority of a quorum\footnote{Id.}—prescribed to be at least “one plus a quarter of the total number of members” under Turkey’s Constitution.\footnote{Constitution of the Republic of Turkey Nov. 7, 1982, art. 96.} Though the latter change could reduce the president’s ability to pass legislation if the AKP does not maintain its majority, losing the majority is unlikely to happen in the near future. The actual result is to reduce the legislature’s decision-making capacity on avenues not sanctioned by the president and their party.\footnote{Ekim & Kirişci, supra note 34.} The 2017 constitutional referendum also increased President Erdoğan’s power over the judiciary by increasing his control over the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK), which is responsible for judicial appointments and promotions.\footnote{Id. This was accomplished by eliminating legislators’ right to submit oral or written questions to the president as part of the legislature’s auditing process. Id.}

The only reasonable solution to the Turkish government’s undue influence on the state’s judiciary is for the judiciary to reform itself from within. Many of these reforms must be led by the HSK, though this will be difficult due to the aforementioned control President Erdoğan holds over the council.\footnote{Id. This was accomplished by reducing the overall size of the body from 22 members to only 13. Id. The president’s allotment of four appointees to the Council remained undiminished so that the president went from appointing approximately 18 percent of the body to approximately 31 percent. Id.} The cooperation of both the executive and legislative branches would be necessary to decrease this control, so this note will focus on reforms the HSK can carry out internally. Essentially, the HSK needs to take charge of judicial reform and prioritize justice over political alignments. Necessary reforms that the HSK
might accomplish include heightening professional standards, revising disciplinary procedures, increasing transparency, and making criminal peace judgeship decisions subject to appeal before Turkey’s ordinary courts.

Heightening professional standards for judges will help counteract the “brain drain” occurring in Turkey’s judiciary. Currently, the judge selection process in Turkey involves a written exam and an interview with a seven-member board, five of whom are from the Ministry of Justice. Promotion requires only two years of service at the judge’s current position. A former judge, Koksal Sengun, has suggested a minimum age, such as 40, for high judges and judges on criminal courts. According to Sengun, “These [criminal] judges have three or five years’ experience, sitting at the top of a court that hands down the heaviest sentences.” Imposing a minimum age or number of years’ experience for promotions is crucial to ensuring that judges have the experience necessary to cope with pressure and enforce justice. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) also recommends distancing the interview process from the Ministry of Justice and prioritizing training in human rights and constitutional law for new judges.

The second reform the HSK must consider is revising its disciplinary procedures. The HSK needs to conform its process for considering disciplinary cases against judges and prosecutors to international standards. It should also consider taking special note of documents such as the ECHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, and the UN Guidelines on Prosecutors. Currently, the law “only requires a mere ‘connection’ or ‘affiliation’ with an [sic] ‘structure, formation, or group’ that the National Security Council has determined to operate against the national security of the State” in order to justify judicial dismissal. In conforming its process to international standards—especially due process—HSK disciplinary decisions must also be subject to appeal within the court system. Finally, the ICJ notes that judicial transfers—often ordered by the Ministry of Justice—must be independently reviewed so that these transfers are not used to either interfere with cases or as disguised disciplinary measures. Increased transparency will also help ensure that judicial transfers are done for legitimate reasons.

156 See supra Section II.A.2.
158 Id. Promotion requirements also include not “being subject to any adverse court ruling or disciplinary sanction.” Id.
159 Special Report, supra note 37.
160 Id.
162 INT’L COMM’N (2016), supra note 147, at 22.
164 INT’L COMM’N (2016), supra note 147, at 22.
Beyond reforming transfers and the disciplinary process, which would decrease judges’ and prosecutors’ fear of retribution for deciding or acting against the AKP’s interests, the HSK generally needs to provide more transparency for all of its decisions, in particular for appointments. Increased transparency can help expose exactly where, and to what extent, the APK is exerting influence over the judiciary. More detailed information will help human rights organizations and justice activists target their efforts to where they will be most effective.

This note’s final domestic reform recommendation is to make criminal peace judgeship decisions subject to appeal before ordinary courts. Turkey established courts of criminal judgeships of peace in 2014, which supervise investigations and issue search, arrest, and detention warrants. These criminal judgeships of peace are separate from ordinary courts, and the means of appealing the judgeships’ decisions are limited to review before another judgeship in the original district, which has been described as a “horizontal” appeal and deemed insufficient by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. The judgeships’ decisions may only be appealed to the TCC under the most exceptional circumstances, creating an effectively closed system. Given the state’s history of human rights abuses under criminal anti-terrorism laws, Turkey’s criminal warrant system should be opened to appeal in ordinary courts.

B. International

Beyond Turkey’s domestic borders, Turkey needs to be held accountable to international law. Even without having ratified Protocol No. 12, Turkey has ratified other essential provisions of the ECHR, such as the right to life and prohibition of torture. While the ECtHR needs to rule against Turkey where the state does violate the ECHR because it is an authoritative condemnation from the international community, the many decisions from the ECtHR and other international courts have not seemed to effect any actual change in Turkey’s policies or abuses.

The ECtHR is a body in the Council of Europe, and the Council’s Committee of Ministers enforces its decisions. However, the Committee of Ministers operates in a supervisory role, with actual punitive measures for noncompliance primarily limited to fines. States and decisions remain under supervision until the Committee of Ministers decides the underlying problem

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166 INT’L COMM’N (2016), supra note 147, at 18.
167 Id. at 19.
169 INT’L COMM’N (2016), supra note 147, at 19.
170 Treaty List, supra note 108.
171 European Court of Human Rights, supra note 135.
in the state has been resolved, but this is a very indefinite and seemingly ineffective enforcement method—at least concerning Turkey.

A common criticism of international law and international legal bodies is that they lack “centralized means of enforcement.” The responsibility of enforcing international law is generally focused domestically. That cannot be the end of the analysis for Turkey, because domestic enforcement of international law has failed thus far. Since both Turkey’s judiciary and international legal bodies have been ineffectual, international intervention from other states might be the solution.

For example, economic and trade sanctions can be useful tools in forcing states to abide by international treaties and standards. However, sanctions may have differing levels of success depending on what activities they are targeting. A number of studies have found that economic sanctions typically have adverse effects on human rights in target states. These adverse effects depend on the types of human rights violations being targeted—using categories such as economic rights, basic human rights, women’s rights, and political and civil liberties. For example, economic sanctions do not seem to affect economic rights, but they do have a positive relationship with improving women’s rights in target states due to the fact that more women enter labor markets following economic shocks. However, said positive relationship only applies to women’s economic and not their social rights, which deteriorate.

A study from 2020 found that economic sanctions—specifically those from the U.S.—have an adverse effect on both basic human rights as well as political and civil liberties in target states. There may be even more significant adverse effects when the sanctions come from international organizations, such as the U.N., than from individual states. Beyond the negative immediate effects of economic sanctions, continued implementation still sees

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173 Id.


175 Id. at 2–3.


178 See generally Gutmann et al., supra note 177 (listing the four categories).

179 Id. at 175, 177.

180 Id.

181 Id. at 175.

182 Wood, supra note 177, at 509. See also Peksen, supra note 177, at 74.
no improvement.\textsuperscript{183} Essentially, economic sanctions on Turkey may compound the state’s human rights violations against its political prisoners, both during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond. Alternative, noneconomic tools, such as arms embargoes or banning participation in international sporting events, may be more likely to promote change in Turkey without endangering civilians due to sanctions fallout.\textsuperscript{184}

\textbf{VIII. CONCLUSION}

Turkey’s continued incarceration of its prisoners in pretrial detention during the COVID-19 pandemic violates international human rights law, specifically Articles 2, 3, and 5 and Protocol No. 12 of the ECHR. The ECHR guarantees prisoners a right to life, a prohibition of torture, a right to liberty and security, and a prohibition against discrimination. Turkey should be held to these provisions, which may be accomplished domestically by heightening professional standards for judges, amending HSK disciplinary policies to accord with international standards, increasing transparency in the HSK generally, and opening up Turkey’s criminal peace judgeship system for greater appeal possibilities. Internationally, the ECtHR should attempt to hold Turkey accountable for its human rights abuses and force an amendment to Law No. 7242, but Turkey’s refusal to ratify Protocol No. 12 of the ECHR and the ECtHR’s inability to impose customary international law make this avenue for accountability unlikely. Intervention from other states in the form of noneconomic sanctions would likely be necessary for enforcement and conformity to international law.

\textsuperscript{183} Peksen, \textit{supra} note 177, at 74.

\textsuperscript{184} Wood, \textit{supra} note 177, at 510.